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paper.)I. INTRODUCTION
Since the formulation of the human capital concept, much attention has been
devoted to the relationship between income and schooling. Numerous studies have
demonstrated a substantial positive association between them, a finding which
has not appreciably been altered by standardization for "ability" and family
background. The conventional view is that schooling enhances earnings via
the production of marketable skills, the productivity augmenting view. But,
recent theoretical arguments have demonstrated the possibility that schooling's
private return may be informationally based)In the polar view schooling
serves only to identify those individuals who are more productive in the market,
the proposition being that an individual's productivity is unaffected by the
schooling experience, i.e •,thepure screening view.
A brief outline of the paper will serve to demonstrate its aims. In section
II a model is developed which explores the impact of input-quality uncertainty
on factor demand from which is derived a rationale for the use of devices which
segment the population into classes differing in their "skill" distribution
parameters.2 The model, however, ignores the motivation of individuals toac-
quire the characteristics upon which firms screen, in particular, the greater
incentive for the more productive to purchase the screen. This aspect has been
explored by Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1973) and will not be explicitly con-
sidered here. In section III the social value of schooling's informational
context is derived withinthepreceeding framework. Section IV describes some
empirical attempts to isolate the productivity and identification effects. The
last section suimnarizes the paper.2
II. ThE MODEL
Thestiiiiulus for job market screening is derived from imperfect information
about the quality of prospective employees. Workers must be selected from a
population composed of individuals possessing a diverse set of productive attri-
butes, most, or even all, of which cannot be observed by finns prior to employ-
ment and possibly for some time after.
To begin, consider the set of productive attributes to consist of all those
skills (technical knowledge, motivation, responsibility) which are perceived by
firms as contributing to an individual's productivity. Since schooling can be
viewed as either augmenting some of the elements in an individual's vector of
skills or as a predictor of these elements, or both, it is not considered as be-
longing to the set. Similarly, race, sex, experience, marital status and other
characteristics which (may) serve as possible information sources to the firm
are excluded. To clarify the distinction, the attributes themselves will be
referred to as elements of an individual's human capital stock and the character-
istics as screening devices. Note that a screening device is not necessarily
passive, but, as with experience, may augment an individual's stock of marketable
skills. In this general sense, there is no presumption that screening devices
are only associatively rather than causally related to human capital stocks.
All potential information sources are similarly classified regardless of the
nature of their relationship to actual productivities.
vbre concretely, let k. =(k.1,k.2, ...,kin)be the th individual's
skill vector where the total potential set consists of n different types; thus,
for any single individual some of the elements may be zero. Corresponding to
a job task or "occupation" there is assumed to exist a transformation which maps
each individual's combination of elementary attributes into a unique skill index.S3
The th individual's skill index for the th occupation is given by
=f(ku, k2 •..,kin).Sincethe f. 'S are assumed to vary across
job tasks with respect to both the number of elements affecting the skill
index and their marginal contributions to the skill index, individuals
will be assinged a different skill index for each occupation.
The production process within the firm is assumed to take the following
form:
(1) Y =F(S1,S2, ...,S,K)5
where
L.
3 th S. = Es. =aggregateskill for the jjobtask
1=1
and
=thenumber of individuals employed in the th tasks
K =anon-labor input.
Notice that in this formulation workers substitute perfectly within occu-
pations but not necessarily between occupations.
Suppose that firms have no a priori estimates of individual human capital
vectors. Instead, let the th skill index be distributed over the population
with mean and variance both of which are known with certainty by the
firm. Each firm is seen as drawing a random sample from the population for
each occupation with being the obtained sample skill mean for the JtF occu-
pation. The first two moments of the sample mean are and where L
is the size of the sample drawn (the number of workers employed). The firm
receives S = aggregateunits of the Jth skill index which is itself
distributed with mean =
PJL
and variance cY2L. Upon taking a second-order4
approximation of the production function around the point . . q, , K),
expected output is given by




where it is assumed that sampling is independent over the v occupations and
2 where R. =a./
(the variance-mean ratio for the jth occupation) and
2
=4 evaluatedat (S1, s2•••v'K).Thus, expectedoutput is
33 dsj
thatlevel of output obtained with certainty if labor were homogeneous plus
a variance correction.
The basic predictions of the model can be illustrated most easily with




where =pL,R =a2/p andianda2 are as previously defined.
The variance-mean ratio (R) can be interpreted as a measure of uncer-
tainty attached to the labor input in the following sense. If individuals
possessed identical skill vectors so that a2 =0,the profit-maximizing
level of aggregate skill could be obtained without error. For example,
denoting S" as the optimal skill input and as the number of skill units
embodied ineachindividual, L* =S/iwouldbethe optimal labor input.
However, if humancapitalvectors differ (a2 >0)the firm can never be
.5
assuredof obtaining L* regardless of its sampling decision. The question
is whether the firm will alter its employment decision in response to the
introduction of skill variance.
The first effect attributable to the introduction of uncertainty is
a reduction in expected output at the original equilibrium input levels.
Since =4 F
<0under the concavity assumption,
—R_l 7
(4)2 R 2 j:r R<°
Firms will, therefore, always prefer to sample from a population character-
ized by lower variance.8





(8)A = = NEC(marginalexpected cost),
where is the wage rate (identical for each individual as they are indis-
tinguishable prior to hiring), K is the rental rate per unit of capital,
and is the product price.
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to
skill variance, allowing inputs to vary but maintaining a constant mean
skill index, and solving for input and marginal cost adjustment, yields
dX/A_l ci?
2 A A [(z)Ao2L@2 K'6
(10) 2 = -
AL La2 ALLK2 Aa]
(11) = - AK - ALK -Ko2A]
where A is the usual bordered Hessian determinant and subscripted A's are
the relevant cofactors.9
The first effect of skill variance has been shown to be a reduction
in expected output at the original input levels. The second effect entails
a movement away from the previous optimal factor ratio at the new lower level
of expected output. This substitution effect can be isolated by setting
-2equal to zero in (9) and (10). This, after some manipulation, d
yields
10





where ELK is the elasticity of substitution between K and L, the latter being
evaluated at p.
Upon expanding (12) it is found that the substitution effect is related






The signs of and FK indicate the rate at which the marginal product of
skill declines with increased usage of labor and capital respectively." If
FK >0,an. increase in the quantity of capital retards the rate of decline
.7
inlabor's marginal product (and raises its own marginal expect product for
anyincrease in variance, Ko2 >0),while a negative value implies an
acceleration in the rate of decline in labor's marginal product (in which
case <0) Asimilar set of conditions applies to the own third
partial, .Ina sense these third partials can be considered as
indexes of similarity with a positive sign implying complementarity and a
negative sign competitiveness.
Although one might expect finns to substitute away from the risky input
(labor), this is not necessarily the case. It is possible for an increase
in the labor input to reduce the adverse effect of variance on expected out-
put if the rate of decline of labor's marginal product is sufficiently slow,
i.e., if is sufficiently positive. The sign of the substitution effect
is determined by the relative effect of the two inputs in reducing the impact
of variance on expected output)3
Figure 1 illustrates the case of a negative substitution effect where A
corresponds to the position prior to the introduction of quality uncertainty
and B corresponds to the new equilibrium factor ratio established at the
lower level of expected output, 'il' after introducing uncertainty. There are,
however, two further effects. First, there is a direct production effect
corresponding to a northward movement along the new expansion path in order
to restore output to its previous levelC0). This, together with the sub-
stitution effect, corresponds to the usual output constant substitution
adjustment. Second, there is an induced production effect in response to
a change in marginal expected cost after regaining the original output level.
In Figure 1 the direct effect is shown as a niwement from B to C and the
induced effect from C to D.8
L S
Figure 1. The Effect of Skill Variance on Factor Demand
Both the direct and induced effects are movements along the same expansion5
path and must be in opposite directions. The question concerns the dominant
one. The net scale effect is found by setting dY2 -2=0in equation
di
(9) and is given by




L L K K
where and are the elasticities of marginal cost with respect to
EL EPK
factor prices. The percentage change in marginal cost is a weighted sum of
percentage changes in marginal expected products, where the sign of the
weights depend upon the normality or inferiority of the factors. Figure 1





in expected output from to
Although the results of the previous analysis are somewhat ambiguous as




pointto note is that firms are definitionally "risk" averse; quality uncer-
tainty must lead to a reduction in expected output. The following extension
makes use of this proposition to show how the firmmay use screeningdevices
to reduce uncertainty. Although schooling is used throughout as the device
analyzed, the model is perfectly general for any screen as previously defined.
Suppose there to be only two schooling classes denoted as E and EH with
the former being the higher level. Let the corresponding parameters of the
skill distributions associated with these classes be i.i,-,a2c and1 H'
respectively. Awareness by the firm of individual schooling levels would
enable it to sample independently from within each schooling class. The firm's





+ andvariance HLH+ whereLH and Lc are the numbers
ofindividuals sampled from each group.
Expected output is 2 2+L -
HT11c C' 'H11{ +
1ICLC
The marginal rate of substitution between the two worker classes is, with a
fixed stock of capital, given by





Supposethat education acts as a perfect screen so that individuals within
schooling classes are homogeneous, =
G2C
=0.The use of schooling as a
screen eradicates the uncertainty previously associated with the labor input.
Since R,1 =Rc
=0,the MRS is independent of the ratio of workers sampled from
the two classes. Workers substitute perfectly at the rate given by the ratio
of their average levels of skill, H'C•10
Since in the absence of screening all individuals are equally compensated,S
any single firm would perceive itself as being in a better position when the
information is utilized. For any given total labor input, L,theexpected
gain from screening is
(17)F(cL, K) -[F(iiL,K) +1/2RjLF]
andis composed of two components, the output effect of the increased aggre-
gate skill level (1Lasopposed to pL)andthe output gain due to variance
reduction (in this case to zero))-5
Vhen education is an imperfect screen, 02C,a2H0, and there are many
reasons why this will be the case, workers from the two schooling classes
are no longer perfect substitutes. The MRS will be less than unity at all
input ratios if > and <R.
Neither condition is, in itself,
sufficient. In the example that follows strict preference for the more
schooled, i.e.,
- < 1for all labor ratios, is assumed)-6 it can
be demonstrated that a necessary condition for isoquants to be convex is
that <0,i.e., the marginal expected product of skilldeclines)-7
Figure 2 illustrates the employment decision when schooling is an
imperfect screen and there is strict preference for the more schooled.
With equal wage rates, profit maximization would entail the employment of
individuals froma single schooling class. If AB is a representative
isoquant and AC the unit sloped iso-cost line, a corner solution is obtained
at A, where only the more schooled are employed. For a fixed labor input,
the gain from screening (the loss from ignoring schooling's screening poten-
tial) is given by the difference in revenue associated with any point along
18




The gain from utilizing the screen is a function of the degree to which
skill parameters diverge. For a fixed labor input, L, the return to employing
an additional Ec worker (thus, one fewer EH worker) is given by
(18) ft = 4).
(1.IC - +
(Rç
The marginal return to employing an extra preferred worker is a positive
function of - and -l9,2O
Competitive bidding for the more schooled will cause to rise relative
to WH.2' For example, in Figure 2 the new isocost line, MN, reflects the
increased relative demand for EC workers. As shown, a new equilibrium posi-
tion is established at D where workers from both schooling classes are
employed by the firm.22
Since schooling's sorting efficiency can be expected to vary with occu-
pation, in general, occupations will be characterized by different proportions
of schooled labor. The factor intensities of occupations with respect to
schooling classes will depend upon comparative advantages. Even if the more
dLc -IY<l
0 N B12
schooled have an absolute advantage in many occupations, those occupations
for which skill parameters most diverge (in combination with the output
cost of variance and the level of marginal expected skill products) will be
more schooled-labor intensive.
To si.immarize, several components of schooling's private return have been
identified. The first is attributable to differences in average skill levels
which mayormaynotbear any other than an associative relationship to the
educational process. The second component is a function of skill variances,
the demand for labor of a given class being negatively associated with its
23,24 variance -meanratio.
III. IHE SOCIAL RETURN TO SCREENING
The major point of screening models is that the empirically observed
private return to schooling can be generated within a framework of incom-
plete information without relying on hunan capital augmentation.25 The
importance of this interpretation hinges upon the magnitude of schooling's
social return, ie., the social value of schooling's informational content.
In a strict sense, in both Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1973), the
information itself has no social value -thesocial return to schooling is,
in fact, negative. If education imparts no marketable skills, from a social
perspective the resources used in the acquisition of schooling are social
wastes. The reason is simply that in these models constant marginal products
are assumed. To illustrate, if k is the constant marginal product of skill,
p the average skill level and L the labor stock, gross social product is
ki-IL. Net social output is kpL -gLwhere g is the output cost per schooled
individual and LC the number of such individuals. The optimal social invest-
ment in education is zero since gross social output is unaffected by the
number of schooled individuals.13
Consider the following example. Suppose there are two productivity types
of individuals (A and B) and two schooling classes (Ec and EH). Assume that
the distribution of skill within the two schooling groups have as their re-
spective means and variance (UC, a2C) and H' cH) with C> In parti-
cular, consider the case where education is a perfect screen so that cx2H
= = 0.Let 5A be the skill endowment of all type A individuals and SB
that of all type B with LA and LBbeingtheir respective numbers and SA > SB.
With a perfect screen =
5A'H =SB,L =LAand =
LB.Gross social
product with constant marginal products is simply k(pcLc + 1'HLH) =kSwhere
S is aggregate skill.
Now suppose that production is characterized by equation (2), Section
II and that thereare N firms each employing L workers. For the1th firm,
actualoutput is
(19) Y =F(S,K) =F(L,K)
where is the mean skill level obtained by the 1th firm from a random sample
of L workers. Taking a second-order approxiiation around=jiL(=),the
expected aggregate skill input, yields
(20)Y =F(L,K) + (-i)LF +4lii)2L2F.
Aggregateoutput is
(21) ZY. =NF(pL,K) +4L2F (•)2
sinceZ( -ii)
=0,astotal skill must be exhausted. Since F< 0, total
productis maximized where E(. ...)2 =0,i.e. where each firm obtains the
identical mean skill level. Maintaining the assumption of a perfect screen,
it can easily be demonstrated that14
(22) EY =NF+4 F(ic







where Lc1 is the 1th firm's labor input obtained from the Ec schooling class
and La/N is the number of Ec workers the th firm would obtain if the Lc
workers were equally distributed over firms. But, it was demonstrated in
Section II that in utilizing the screen each firm samples the same number
of workers from within a schooling class so that Lc1 =Lcfor all i and
N
aggregate output is, therefore maximized.
It can further be deninstrated that as education becomes a less perfect
screen (a2C, H >0),its social benefit declines. In this case, even as
firms employ the same factor proportions (L /LH), variations in aggregate
skill will persist since within-group skill variances are not zero. The return
to screening is due to the elimination of between-group variance; it is as if
each firm samples from a population with smaller skill variance. Regardless
of screening efficiency, the output loss from ignoring the information is a
rising function of the difference in skill endowments, i.e., a positive
function of -
Inthe above analysis, schooling's only function is as an identification
device given fixed skill endowments. But, suppose that schooling creates pro-
ductivity differences. This effect can be demonstrated by differentiating
equation (21) with respect to p, yielding
d Y. 1 2 - 21 2
d(E(s. -)2)
(23) '= NLF +L (s -p)+LF dii
The first term reflects the direct output effect of the increase in aggregate
skill. The second term shows the impact of the rise in aggregate skill on15
schooling's informational return for a given screening efficiency. If
>0,the output cost of skill dispersion between firms falls while
the opposite is true if <0.When schooling is a perfect screen this
term is zero; the more imperfect the screen initially, the more important
isthis effect. The last term reflects the change in screening efficiency
accompanying the rise in average skill. In general, a rise in within-group
variances will increase variation in aggregate skill between firms and, thus,
reduceaggregate output. Therefore, schooling inducedincreases in the
averageskill level of a population will have its greatest positive impact
on aggregate output the higher is the marginal product of skill, the more
slowly it declines and the more homogeneous schooling groups become.27
With the introduction of a second "occupation" or type of skill,
schooling's informational return may be further enhanced. As before, the
social return to identification is related to reductions in aggregate skill
variation between finns. However, there is also a social gain to allocating
individuals to their most productive uses which will be operative if schooling's
sorting efficiency differs by occupation or if the output cost of uncertainty
varies by occupation.28
IV. EMPIRICALTESTS OFThE SCREENING HYPOTHESIS
Although a wide range of studies exist on the schooling-income relationship
few npirica1 attempts have been directed toward discovering the generating
mechanism. Much of the work has been concerned with assessing the bias in
schooling's private return which results from ignoring measures of ability.
The results have consistently found a minimal reduction in schooling's incre-
mental effect on earnings.29 However, it would be erroneous to conclude from16
this that schooling directly produces human capital rather than serving an
identification function. The reason is that screening arises solely as a
consequence of imperfect inforination.Schooling is simply a proxy for earnings
producing skills. Even if ability measures were perfectly correlated with
productive skills, but firms were unaware of each individual's ability
(measure), schooling might still have a larger impact on earnings over the life
cycle. Thattheseability measures only imperfectly correlate withjobsuccess
mayactuallybe only a peripheral consideration for the applicability of these
studiesto the screening hypothesis •30
Considersome of the previous attempts to isolate the identification and
productivity effects. There is only one published empirical study of which
I am aware, that by Taubman and Wales (1973), which purports to isolate a
significant identification role. i\ccording to the authors, screening is said
to occur when individuals, due to their lack of education, are restricted S
from entering occupations in which their marginal products are greatest. In
other words, if individuals could freely choose their occupations, a greater
proportion of those with lower schooling levels would be found in higher
31
paying occupations.
Their screening test involves a comparison of the actual and expected
fractions of people with different educational attainment in various occu-
pations. To derive the expected distribution under free entry, within-
occupation earnings regressions were estimated from which the potential
incomes of individuals in other occupations were obtained.32 Their occupa-
tional regressions included schooling, ability, age, and several other socio-
economic variables. Occupations were grouped into three categories with
separate dummies for individual occupations. The groupings were (1) profes-
sional, sales, and technical; (2) blue-collar, white-collar, and service;17
(3) managerial. No interactions were used so that earnings merely shift up
or down for occupations within each broad classification.
The problem with this method, ignoring the assumptions made in calcu-
lating the expected distribution, is that individuals with the same observed
characteristics are, by definition, equally productive; yet, observed character-
istics account for only part of the variance in earnings. If these unmeasured
skills are correlated with schooling and more important in some occupations
than others, potential earnings will be overestimated for the less schooled
in those occupations.33 Although Taubmari and Wales realize that this problem
exists, they state that they cannot determine its importance. However, one
can see from their results that the effect is swamping all others. Table 1
duplicates their findings although it is rearranged in a nre revealing
manner.
The authors conclude from this table that: "In general, then, under the
assumption of free entry and income maximization, very few people at any
educational level uld choose the blue collar, white collar, or service
occupations Thefact that the highschool and somecollege groups pre-
dominatein these occupations is taken as evidence of educational creden-
tialism. Notice that when the occupations are grouped as they were in the
regressions, the expected fractions in the three broad occupational cate-
gories are aliiost identical for the three schooling classes. Taubnianand
Waleshave merely made people look iire alike than they really are. Thus,
the problem they have in explaining the result that the expected proportion
of college graduates in the highest paying occupations exceeds the actual
proportion(after all, they are the preferred group), is easily resolved.
The interpretation of their results as due to entry barriers is not war-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































obtain under strict income maximization, the question would still remain as
to whether schooling produced those occupational skills or merely signalled
theirendowment.
Theempiricalwork presented here is confined to two issues approximating
the mean and variance components of schooling's return previously discussed.
In all cases, an attempt is made to discern the existence of a significant
identification component to schooling's return.
A general description of the data base employed follows. The NBER-
Thorndike sample cons4sts of approximately 5000 men who were air force pilot,
navigator and bombadier candidates in 1943. The population was obtained from
a subsample of 17,000 men from whom Thorndike collected information in 1955
on earnings, job experience and other socioeconomic variables including
numerical scores on seventeen tests administered by the air force in 1943
which purport to measure various capabilities ranging from manual dexterity
to abstract problem solving capabilities. The NBER resampled a subset of
these men in 1969 and again in 1971 updating data on job histories and socio-
economic characteristics. Specifically, the data includes information on
jobs held in five separate time intervals: 1945-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-1962,
1963-1966, and l967-l970. Information on jobs held in years other than
those corresponding to the interview years are retrospective. All indivi-
duals are at least high school graduates and a majority have an undergraduate
degree or some graduate training. Ages, as of 1969, range from 42 to 55.
Since, for many, employment was interrupted by the war, accurate esti-
mates of market experience were obtained by restricting attention to those
individuals whose initial job occurred after military service and, in parti-
cular, within the 1945-1952 interval. Experience is calculated simply as the
difference between a reported job year lying within any of the five periods20
and the initial job year; it is thus, by definition, zero for the initial
job. Further exclusions were those individuals with extended military ser-
vice, those who were civilian pilots, the disabled and the unemployed. The
constructed longitudinal sample consists of 9,799 separate experience-
earnings points.
Earnings profiles were estimated for both private wage workers and for
the self-employed.36Table 2 reports the results for several specifications.
The dependent variable in this and all other tables is the natural logarithm
of earnings (in 1958 dollars), S is schooling completion level, P is experi-
ence, and A is an IQ-type abilitymeasure.37 Since it will be argued that
the relevant hypotheses are concerned with coefficient equality as between
the two groups, the regressions in Table 2 (and all others except where noted)
are from a pooled sample in which each coefficient represents the partial
effect of a given variable for one or the other group. Descriptive statis-
tics for selected variables are found in Table 1 of Appendix B.
If a major portion of schooling's private return is merely informational,
it should manifest itself in a smaller earnings increment to the self-employed
and/or a lower average schooling level. Clearly, there is less incentive for
the more productive among the self-employed to use schooling as an identifi-
cation device.39 vbreover, lacking Spence's self-selection mechanism, the
sorting of more productive types by schooling should be less clear and since
the self-employed can earn at most only the market's valuation of their
marginal product, the incremental effect of schooling on earnings should be
lower for this group. However, when one looks at the schooling effect in
Table 2, equations 1 and 2, it is seen that schooling has a differentially










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































schoolinglevels are very similar with private wage workers obtaining 15.6
years of schooling and the self-employed15.3.41 A major screening role is
not indicated by- these results.
One obvious modification is to delete the professional class (doctors,
lawyers, teachers, etc.) since it is, in many instances, subject to public
screening through occupational licensure. Table 3 reports the results for
all individuals who were not professional on either their first or their
last reported job.42 As seen, the overall schooling coefficient is, in
magnitude, somewhat smaller for the self-employed. These differences are
not "significant" in a statisticalsense.43 Moreover, when "ability" is
controlled for, as one should if this measure is known by the firm, the
difference is less pronounced. Further average schooling levels again do
notdiverge significantly (see Table 3 of Appendix B).
Similar reasoning applies to the effect of college quality on earnings
asbetween the two groups.If the quality of college attended isusedas a
screenand merely serves a classificatory function, its effect should be less
pronounced on the earnings of the self-employed. To facilitate the comparison,
the subsample of college graduate non-professionals (only those with exactly
16 years of schooling) was chosen. The regression equations are presented
in Table 4 where Q represents the college quality variable and other symbols
are as previouslydefined.44 It is seen that the overall quality effect is
larger for the self-employed. If the quality variable can be interpreted as
a measure of accrued knowledge, it appears that these acquired skills are
indeed productive in the market. Furthermore, the incentive for the self-
employed to obtain higher quality schooling seems not to be dampened as


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Acomparison of average incomes of rural farm workers andurban
workersat alternative schooling levels found in Welch (1971) alsosupports
thehuman capital view. The argument is basically the same as that with
respect to the self-employed andprivatewage comparison made above, since
therural farm class is predominantly composed of self-employed individuals.
As Table 5 illustrates, the percentage increase in earnings with: increased
schooling is larger for the rural farm class. The absence of a screening
motive would preclude such a result if schooling did not augment producti-
vities. There is no reason for the more able among rural farmers to be
more prone to obtain schooling unless they perceive some benefit which,
for them, must result from skill augmentation rather than identification.
TABLE 5(a)
INCOME IN 1959 FORURBAN AN]) RJJRAL FARM MALES,45-54
YEARSOLD,BYYEARS OF SGIOOLING
Comparison for the 1-4 Years 12 Years 16 Years
(1)UrbanAverage 4,370 6,900 10,130
(2)RuralAverage 2,780 4,900 7,600
(3)2 ÷ 1 0.64 0.71 0.75
(a)Source: Welch(1971), Table 2; computedfrom U.S. Census
of Population.
Furtherindependent evidence is supplied by Pencavel (1974) in a
studyofpiece rate and timeratepayment schemes. The male (fnale)
segment of the sample consisted of 183 (120) punch press operators in26
12 (8) firms, 84 (51) of whom worked on time-rates and 99 (69) on piece-
rates. According to our previous discussion, a dominant identification
function of schooling would imply substantially lower schooling levels
for piece-rate workers.45 In fact, Pencavel finds for males that the
average level of schooling is 9.16 for those in piece-rate and 9.71 for
those on an hourly rate and for females 9.57 and 9.22 respectively, re-
suits which are not supportive of a major screening role.
A test for the variance component of the screening return postulated
in section II can be made explicit under the assumption that post-schooling
investments are zero. If the variance effects are operative, the private
return to schooling maybelarger thanthatwhichiswarrantedby actual
productivitydifferences. However, as firms learn about productivities,
wage rates will adjust to reflect performance. Wages should, thus,
regress to their certainty levels over time. S
Recall that ambiguous theoretical results were obtained with respect
to the effect of uncertainty on labor demand. Initial wages might be
above or below that which would prevail under uncertainty. With perfect
information and the absence of human capital accumulation after the
schooling period, mean wage profiles for the two schooling classes would
be horizontal as depicted in Figure 3. Those with more schooling would
earn AC more at all levels of experience. However, with variance effects
favoring the more educated and assuming a negative impact of uncertainty
on labor demand, wage profiles would be given by A'B and C'D where full
learning is assumed to occur T years after initial work experience. Wage










Complications arise when there are opportunities for on-the-job
training. If post-school investment behavior is systematically related
toeducational attainment, any degreeof convergence ordivergence can
be elicited. If there is a positive association, earningsprofiles will
fanout over time. In this case, variance effects will be discernable
only if they outweigh training effects.
Sinceconvergence implies declining earnings differentials between
schooling classes with experience, a negative coefficient on a schooling-
experienceinteraction term (SP) wouldbeconsistent with a positive bias
inschooling's private return due to imperfect information. However, a
positive interaction term results (Equation 3, Tables 2 and 3)for private
wage workers, those who would be subject to uncertainty effects. If such
abias exists, it is swampedbyfurther training investments. For the






profiles should diverge to a greater extent for this group if investment
patterns are identical for the two groups. There is no strong confirmation
of this effect.
It could be argued that the positive ability-experience interaction
observed for the private class of workers is confirmation of schoolingts
informational role. If the ability measure reflects productivity endow-
ments, its impact should rise with experience as firm learning occurs.
Mreoever, tie fact thatthisinteraction is insiguificaiit for self-
employed workers should strengthen the argunent. However, the ability
measure is never relevant for the self-employed; indeed, a larger ability
effectwould be expected for this group at initial experience (P =0)
than for those privately employed since, if the latter are subject to a
screeningprocess, individuals of different ability would be more equally
compensated. This, however, is not the case.
V. SIJMvIARY
Recently,questions have been raised concerning the underlying nature
of the observed relationship between income and schooling. The issue
revolves around the extent to which formal schooling serves to augment
worker productivity and, thus, social product, as opposed to conveying
information to employers about the probable productive capabilities of
prospective workers without, in itself, affecting those capabilities.
Thispaperfirst explored a theoretical model of this latter "screening"
role and then attempted an empirical investigation of its relative impor-
tance. The basis for the model was that individual productivities are
unknowntothe firm prior to hiring andareneither instantaneously nor29
costlessly determinable from direct observation of on-the-job performance.
The information available to the firm was restricted to knowledge (a sub-
jective notion was also treated) of the first two moments of the population's
skill distribution with output a function of occupation-specific aggregate
skill levels and capital. Within an expected profit maximization framework,
uncertainty in the form of skill variance was shown to lead to a reduction in
expected profits at the previous input scales and to substitution and pro-
duction effects on factor employment. It was further demonstrated that the
demand for workers associated with a given schooling group depended upon both
the average skill level and the variance —mean skill ratio of the group. Thus,
schooling's private return could be viewed as a reflection of its informational
content, i.e., its sorting function. Further, eliminating between group skill
variance through the use of identification or screening devices was shown to
lead to a more efficient allocation of workers both within and across firms.
Therefore, even if the higher average skill levels associated with the more
schooled were not produced in the schooling process, schooling's social benefit
would be positive.
Several tests aimed at distinguishing between the two views were conducted.
A comparison of self-employed and private wage workers with respect to their
schooling decision and the life-cycle effects of schooling on earnings yielded
results which are not consistent with the existence of a substantial identi-
I
fication or screening function. Other independent evidence was also reported
which support this view.APPENDIX A
30
Consider the production function given by equation Cl) in the text.
First-order conditions for profit maximization are:











Totally differentiating (A.l) to (A.4) with respect to


















SolvingfordLIK/dt1, the effect ofskill variance in the 2,th labor




whereis the determinant ofthe left-hand square m.trix andthesub-'.
scripted 'Sarethe relevant co-factors.
The substitution effect is
2 LT









But =cx.a.,wherecx. is the cost share of L. and cx.is the
LL 33k jk
Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution. Therefore,
4'L 2













The substitution effect due to an increase in variance associated
with the £th labor input is, therefore, a weighted sum of percentage
changes in marginal expected factor products, where the weights are pro-
ducts of factor cost shares and partial elasticities of substitution.
The th term in (A.8) will be negative, where this implies a positive
effect on the employment of Lk if the increase in variance either reduces32
the marginal expected product of the th input and the 1th input is
a substitute for the kth ((:1> 0)or the th input's marginal expected
product is enhanced and the 1th input is complementary to the kth jk< 0)
The marginal expected product of the th input will decline if <0
and will rise if F- -- > 0.Opposite conditions hold for the iterm
L))9,LJ.
to be positive.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'Fora formal presentation of the argument see Spence (1973), (1974).
2Spence's model is also concerned with input-quality uncertainty, but the
model is constructed in such a way that expected output is unaffected by
productivity variation except insofar as firms must decide on which jobs to
assign to which individuals. Although this latter consideration is impor-
tant and is explored here as well, it will be demonstrated that even in the
absence of this specific allocation problem expected output (and social
product) will be affected by the existence of a heterogenous labor pool.
Moreover, the model presented in this paper explores the implications of
skill variance on factor employment and develops criteria for the direction
of substitution and output responses akin to those found in usual derived
demand theory.
31n Spence's earlier published work (Spence (1973))no explicit presentation
of the information's social value was given and in a strict interpretation
of the model the social benefit to schooling would, in a pure screening
world, be zero. In his later work (Spence (1974)), the introduction of job
assignment elicits a positive social product to schooling's sorting role,
a possibility previously established under very restrictive assumptions by
Arrow (1973). A more general specification of this proposition is advanced
here which remains even in the absence of alternative occupational assignment.
These transformation functions are assumed to be technologically given and, as
such, fully determine occupational categories. For a linear specification, the
weighting factors can be considered as fixed utilization rates (proportions of
each skill utilized per unit time); n
s.. = U. k. '£=ljl II
where is the utilization rate for the th productive attribute. If all
such transfonTlations are linear, occupations are characterized by the fixed
manner in which attributes are utilized. In the more general case, utilization
rates vary with the proportionate usage of attributes.
>0;52F<0all i.
6AppendixA provides a full treatment of the general case along with explicit
proofs of the propositions which follow.
subscripts refer to partial derivatives, e.g.,$R =
reality, since only a second-order approximation is taken, this statement
is only accurate if all moments of the skill distribution which positively
affect the firm's expected output are unchanged in the comparison.41
9
0
L LL KL >0.
K LK KK
10This formula is independent of the approximation and merely states that
the percentage alteration in factor ratios depends on the variance induced
percentage change in the marginal rate of substitution between the factors.
Thenotion that convexities of marginal curves are important for dispersion
effectsis not new. Infact, it forms the basisfor the Rothschild and







l3examples, for the quadratic production function all third partials
vanish and the sign of the substitution effect must be negative; less of
the uncertain factor is utilized. However, for a Cobb-Douglas production
function, >0and <0s that the substitution effect works in
favor of the labor input.
14For the competitive finn scale effects are depicted in the accompanying
figure. Labelled points correspond to those in Figure 1 of the text.Given
product price, P, output is Y0 prior to the introduction of uncertainty.
With the intrcduction of skill variance, marginal expected cost rises.
MEC I3/
Y%<:?42
There are three possibilities for the net scale effett. If the initial impactS
ofuncertainty is to reduce expected output to =e'
the net scale effect is
zero; the direct production effect is a movementfrom B1 to C and the induced
effect from C back to B1. If expected output initially falls only to >
(B,as in Figure 1) the direct production effect is outweighed bythe induced
effect andthenet scale effect is negative; output falls further from to
Likewise, B2 illustrates a positive net scale effect.
'5By our previous analysis, L, the no-screening optimal labor input, is not
invariant to the use of the infomiation. The perceived potential gain from
screening is, therefore, larger than that depicted in equation (17).
16Theexact relationship between the groupparametersin order to have a
preference for the more educated is that
2 2
cC
- - (-'c -ii)
-
Notethat since <0and >0,
-( ,,)must be positive and
.vI.
greater than unity. In some sense, mean differencesdominate. Preference 5
forthe more schooled at equal wages will be exhibited when the above inequality
holds at Lc =L.
17Actually, the necessary and sufficient condition is
<S
Since <0,the statement in the text is only valid if >0.If
<0, <0is sufficient but not necessary for convexity.
is again an understatement of the gain since L will, in turn, be
altered. See Fn. 11.
19Underthestrict preference assumption _ftmustbe positive for all
Lc <L.If strict preference is not assumed it will be positive to the
point where the optimal LC/LH ratio is realized and negativethereafter.
Note also that the size of the return is also related to the levelof marginal
skill product () and the output cost of uncertainty 'R•43
can further be demonstrated that, assuming convexity, the revenue incre-
ment declines as preferred workers are added, i.e., d2Y
<0.
dLc
21Actually, they may both rise relative to the certainty case if the intro-
duction of uncertainty increases the overall demand for labor relative to
capital.
22(Xitput responses are again ignored.
23There is a third component not discussed here which concerns the finn's
uncertainty about the true value of average skill levels. Assuming that
finmshavea subjective notion as to the level of average skill one can
derive similar expressions for factor demand as those in the text. See
Wolpin (1974).
24Thepreceedinganalysis hasseveralobvious extensions. First, non-zero
costdevices (to the firm) can be treated and optimal patterns of screening
techniques can be traced. The intensity with which firms interview or test
prospective employees will depend on the level of the marginal expected
revenuefunction (equation 18)and its rate of decline in conjunction with
themarginal expected cost of identifyingmore productive types. Second,
since aggregate skill is simply the product of average skill and the number
of workers one can just as easily apply the model to uncertainty about hours
of work associated with different subpopulations. Thus, even if women, for
example, on average can be expected to work the same number of hours per year,
the fact that ,asa group, there is more variability in their labor supply
will lead to a reduction in the demand for their services relative to men.
25 mechanism has been discussed so far which would motivate the more "able"
individuals to obtain schooling and, thus, make it a viable screen if there
are no productivity augmenting effects. In fact, the less productive, if
they perceive the same benefits, would have the same schooling incentive.
One way in which to generate a positive correlation between ability and schooling
is to assume that schools are themselves capable of sorting out the less pro-
ductive. In essence, the less able face lower schooling success probabilities
and, thus, have higher expected schooling acquisition costs. This is, in
essence, Spence's major assumption.
26This assumes that i,thepopulation mean, is unchanged for otherwise aggregate
skill would be altered, changing the magnitude of F
27Throughout this analysis factor employment was fixed. The social benefit
to screening will also include a component which allows firms to alter their
factor proportions in response to the information.44
28Thisis the case treated by Arrow (1973) and Spence (1974).
29See Gintis (1971) and Griliches and Mason (1973).
30See [ayard and Psacharopoulos (1974) for a fuller treatment of this
point. Note, however, thatthistest concerns the use of schooling as an
informationthatwouldbe imparted regardless of schoolings
31Taubman and Wales (1973) have no theoretical justification for this defini-
tion of screening. It is indeed possible that the informational content of
schooling is such that there is little, if any, occupational misallocation
even with occupational restrictions.
32The data set utilized is the same as the one used by this author, the
NBER-Thorndike sample, so that its discussion will be deferred until later.
33Layard and Psacharopoulos make basically the same argument. However, they
fail to note that the problem is strongly reflected in Th's results.
34P. Taubman and 1. Wales. "Education, Ability and Screening." Journal of
Political Economy (81). p.46.
35lnitial job, whichmay have occurred prior to i'M II, is also reported.
36For this table, individuals were categorized on the basis of their last
reported job. Thus, an individual who, in 1969, was self-employed was
entered as such regardless of his previous status, i.e., all of the experience
points corresponding to the individual were assigned to the self-employed
class. Clearly, it would have been nre accurate to make the assignment on
the basis of all jobs between the first and last but, since many individuals did
not report intermediate jobs, this method would have severely restricted the
sample size, particularly within the self-employed class. However, regressions
were also estimated for individuals reporting the same employment status on
both the first and last job alone. The results are qualitatively unaltered as
seen by a comparison of Table 2 in the text to Table 6 in Appendix B.
37The ability measure is a composite of the seventeen tests and was constructed





x22 +U2 referto the separate
regressions for the two worker classes, the pooled regression is of the
form
= =[x1oJ i1+[uj= +
LYZJ L°X2J$2J L.u2J
This construction facilitates hypothesis testing between samples since, for
example, simple t-tests require knowledge only of the variance-covariance
coefficient matrix.45
39We are assuming that customerscreeningby education is not so strong as
to create a large incentive for the self-employed to acquire the signal. However,
we also perform the analysis deleting professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.),
40 thou or wom.cus.omer.creening mightbemost relevant
The null nypotnesis ot coetticient equaiity isrejectedas the associated
t-values are 2.4 and 3.4 for the respective equations.
41The correspondingfigures forthose within the same worker class on the
firstandfifth jobs are 15.6 and 15.2 respectively. See Table 2 of
Appendix B.
42The resultswhen employment status (private vs self-employed) is also
matched are reported inTable 7, Appendix B.The corresponding schooling
levels are found inTable 4, AppendixB.
43Thet-valuesfor the tests of coefficient equality are 1.0 and0.6in
equations 1and2respectively.
44The quality variable is a Gourmanrating. See J.Gourman,The Gourman
Report,Thecontinuing Education Institute, 1967.
451n fact,ifschooling did not augment productivities then why would anyone
choosing an occupation in which performanceiseasilymeasuredincur the
cost of schooling.
46 conclusion is not independent of the learning process. All that is
beingsaid is that the more educated may earn more relative to the less
educated than is warranted by true productivity differences and that over
time relative wages will begin to reflect this initial bias. The incor-
porationof learning into a human capital production framework is clearly
relevant to the shape of earnings profiles. Firm learningmayin fact be
endogenousandmay alsointeract withindividualdecisions about human
capitalaccumulation.
47There are several qualifications to this statement. If schools them-
selves sort individuals by establishing entry barriers, but are rigidly
and correctly applied, the less able among the self-employed can not err
by choosing more than their optimal schooling level. Thus, the only way
to obtain our results would be for the more productive to obtain less
schooling than their privately employed counterpart. However, for this
to occur the decision as to whether one is to be self-employed or not
must be made prior to the termination of schooling. If it is not, then
there is no reason for the self-employed to act differently than salaried
workers. Moreover, even if individuals have some notion that they will
beself-employed, they can hedge against uncertainty by obtaining more
schooling than they otherwise wouldso as to be able to signal employers
about their capabilities if necessary.46
S
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